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WISDOM Advanced Security Measures
Oct 14,2007 00:00
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admin
WISDOM Advanced Security MeasuresWISDOM Advanced Security is designed for high-level security WLANs in a converged network that are subject to regulations or legal security requirements such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2002) for health care systems, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 (U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2002) for financial data, sensitive and secure government systems, or those systems involved in financial transactions. WISDOM Advanced Security also requires that the WLAN security management considerations and those required for WISDOM Intermediate Security described earlier be implemented as part of its layered approach. WISDOM Advanced Security uses an Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) VPN design to provide high-security risk mitigation for Option Three. Because of its widespread use and popularity on wired networks, IPSec is frequently recommended in the literature as a solution for overcoming the inadequate standards-based security mechanism built into 802.11 in wireless networks. Another option, the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), is popular in some Microsoft-dominated networks because it is built into many Microsoft products. IPSec is generally recommended over PPTP for VPN because IPSec is much more resilient in temperamental networking environments such as wireless. Also, because IPSec encrypts and authenticates traffic as needed, the overhead on the network is noticeably less than it is with PPTP, which also makes it possible to temporarily lose your wireless connection and come back without dropping your VPN connection. IPSec has many desirable built-in features, such as integrity checking, mutual authentication, and antireplay. Using a VPN appliance or firewall with IPSec-enabled WLAN clients does not require you to use only a single vendor's equipment, as does LEAP and some 802.1x implementations. IPSec has a few drawbacks in performance and cost that make the risk-benefit most applicable for use in Option Three. IPSec on the WLAN environment prevents roaming, which means that a user will not be able to seamlessly move about from one access point to another. IPSec requires the use of additional equipment, software, administrative management, and training. IPSec VPNs require some overhead in each packet, but this is very small compared to other VPN protocols such as PPTP. In addition, as a VPN protocol, it only supports unicast traffic, so applications that use only broadcast or multicast may not work correctly. WISDOM Advanced Security uses a VPN appliance that allows limited Internet access for WLAN users, but requires an IPSec VPN connection before allowing entrance to the wired network. A VPN requires a VPN switch, also called a VPN gateway, that can be accessed from the Internet. Restricting unnecessary or redundant protocols from the LAN segments that connect the APs to the VPN gateway reduces the possibility of unidentified holes and vulnerabilities. The LAN segments that connect to wireless APs should connect to a corporate VPN gateway, but not directly to the production network. Eliminating APs from the production network minimizes the risk of attack techniques such as packet sniffing. This option also assumes that a WLAN security policy is in place. IPSec is a framework of open standards for ensuring secure private communications over IP networks. IPSec VPNs use the services defined within IPSec to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data communications across public networks, such as the Internet. IPSec also has a practical application to secure WLANs by overlaying IPSec on top of cleartext 802.11 wireless traffic. When IPSec is deployed in a WLAN environment, an IPSec client is placed on every PC connected to the wireless network, and the user is required to establish an IPSec tunnel to route any traffic to the wired network. Filters are put in place to prevent any wireless traffic from reaching a destination other than the VPN gateway and DHCP/DNS server. IPSec provides for confidentiality of IP traffic, as well as authentication and antireplay capabilities. Confidentiality is achieved through encryption using a variant of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) called Triple DES (3DES). Although IPSec is used primarily for data confidentiality, extensions to the standard allow for user authentication and authorization to occur as part of the IPSec process. This scenario offers a potential solution to the user differentiation problem with WLANs. IPSec provides numerous security features. The following have configurable values for the administrator to define their behavior: data encryption, device authentication and credentialing, data integrity, address hiding, and Security-Association (SA) key aging. The IPSec standard requires use of either data integrity or data encryption; using both is optional. WISDOM Option Three will use both encryption and integrity. Data encryption will be set for 3DES. Data integrity comes in two types: 128-bit-strength Message Digest 5 (MD5)-HMAC or 160-bit-strength Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-HMAC. Because the bit strength of SHA is greater, it is considered more secure, and it will be used in this design. A session key's strength is proportional to the number of binary bits comprising the session key file. This means that session keys with a greater number of bits have a greater degree of security and are considerably more difficult to forcibly decode. WISDOM Advanced Security uses IPSec VPN(s) as an overlay security mechanism to access the production network from a WLAN. The WLAN APs will connect to Layer 2 (OSI Model) switches and forward traffic from the WLAN to the wired LAN using IPSec to protect the data until it reaches the wired network. WEP will not be enabled in this design. The WLAN is considered an untrusted network, suitable only as a transit network for IPSec traffic. The WLAN clients associate with a wireless AP to establish connectivity to the wired network at Layer 2. The wireless clients then use DHCP and DNS services in the server module to establish connectivity to the wired network at Layer 3. When the wireless client is communicating with the wired network, but before the IPSec tunnel is established, the client traffic is not considered secure. All of the noted WLAN security issues are still present until the wireless client can secure communications with an IPSec VPN. In addition to the implementation of Option One security requirements, the following will be implemented to mitigate remaining WLAN vulnerabilities:
The VPN gateway can use digital certificates or preshared public keys for wireless device authentication. The VPN gateway then takes advantage of One-Time Passwords (OTPs) to authenticate users to it. Without OTPs, the VPN gateways are vulnerable to brute force login attempts by hackers who have obtained the shared IPSec key used by the VPN gateway. The VPN gateway takes advantage of RADIUS services, which in turn contact the OTP server for user authentication. The VPN gateway uses DHCP for IP address configuration in order for the WLAN client to communicate through the VPN tunnel. Security in this configuration is maintained by preventing network access if a VPN gateway or RADIUS service fails. Both services are required in order for the client to reach the wired network with production traffic. In remote-access VPNs, user authentication and device authentication occurs. When the remote device is authenticated, some level of access control should be in place to permit only the traffic over the tunnel that should be there. Device authentication uses either a preshared key or valid digital certificate issued from a recognized CA to provide the identity of a device. Digital certificates scale better than unique preshared public key pairs because they allow any device to authenticate to any other device but do not have the security properties of wildcard keys. A message digest is the representation of text in the form of a single string of digits, created using a formula called a one-way hash function. Encrypting a message digest with a private key creates a digital signature, which is an electronic means of authentication. A one-way hash is an algorithm that turns messages or text into a fixed string of digits, usually for security or data management purposes. The "one way" means that it is nearly impossible to derive the original text from the string. A one-way hash function is used to create digital signatures, which in turn identify and authenticate the sender and message of a digitally distributed message. Digital certificates are not tied to IP addresses, but to unique, signed information on the device that is validated by the enterprise's CA. If a hacker compromises or steals a device with a digital certificate, the administrator will revoke the digital certificate and notify all other devices by publishing a new Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The CRL contains a CA-signed list of revoked certificates. When a device receives a request for tunnel establishment and uses a digital certificate for proof of identity, the device checks the peer certificate against the CRL. Much of the information required to manage certificates can be stored in a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)-compliant directory. LDAP can also contain CRL information. LDAP, which is used for accessing directory services, provides even greater flexibility for managing certificates. The CA can use LDAP directory information as a means to issue certificates individually or in batches, depending on the security policies of the organization. Other routine management tasks, such as key management and renewing and revoking certificates, can be partially or fully automated with the aid of the directory. Devices generating digital certificates or validating received certificates during tunnel authentication and establishment must know the correct time of day (preferably Coordinated Universal Time [UTC]). This is more than just expiration, it is a frame in which the certificate is valid—not before, not after. Time is also used to determine when the CRL expires so that a new one can be retrieved. Although checking CRLs can be configured as optional, it should always be enabled on remote and head-end devices when digital certificates are deployed. This is the only revocation scheme for digital certificates compared to preshared key pairs that are simply removed from the uncompromised devices. After the device and user authentications (if applicable) are complete, IPSec access control occurs. Normally, the networks, hosts, and ports that are allowed to traverse the tunnels are defined in the Security Policy Database (SPD), as defined by the IPSec protocol (IETF, 2003). This database is populated by the use of ACLs, which are sometimes referred to as "crypto ACLs" or "network rules." For remote-access traffic filtering, access control occurs dynamically by loading the per-user granular authorization information when the user successfully authenticates via extended authentication (XAUTH). WISDOM Advanced Security also provides internal users with connectivity to Internet services and Internet users with access to information on the public servers (e.g., Hypertext Transfer Protocol [HTTP], FTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [SMTP], and DNS). Additionally, this design will terminate VPN traffic from remote users and remote sites as well as traffic from traditional dial-in users. The 10 WISDOM Advanced Security vulnerability, threat, and mitigation elements are described in Table 12.3. The WISDOM Advanced Security topology is shown in Figure 12.3. Key design features and components for WISDOM Advanced Security are as follows:
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