General Architecture Design Guidelines
We've touched on the many design issues needed for security,
but now we boil these down to three key design principles for security
architectures:
-
Isolate potentially hostile traffic from sensitive
traffic.
-
Canalize potentially hostile traffic through a small set
of fixed entry points that are well protected and monitored.
-
Use a layered defense whenever
possible.
Many of you will recognize these as the guidelines that apply
to Internet connections. The firewall is an
instantiation of these principles. It isolates and canalizes traffic through a
fixed entry point, and it can apply additional layers of security through the
use of a virtual private network or additional authentication requirements.
Wireless networks are somewhat more difficult to deal with than
an Internet connection, however. Whereas an Internet connection enters the
enterprise in only a few fixed locations, wireless access points must be located
throughout the enterprise to provide reasonable coverage areas.
So what are our choices in providing isolation and
canalization? Well, we could make each access point a firewall. While this
certainly meets our goals, it also introduces a horrendous management burden in
large enterprises and may not be the best approach in all situations. Certainly
in small office/home office (SOHO) scenarios, this might make some sense because
there is only one access point, however.
You can now recognize some of the tradeoffs you must make when
designing security architectures. A good security architect must balance the
threat, information value, and costs (both monetary and management) in designing
the architecture. While the solution of making every access point a
firewall-like device meets some of the design criteria, it introduces a
potentially difficult management problem in some environments. As a result, you
must select your equipment carefully.
You would be well served by working closely with your vendor or
value-added reseller when choosing equipment. Don't blindly accept statements by
either the vendor or their integrator that the equipment is secure. Ask them to
define what they mean—for example, "Secure against what type of threat?" Be
especially diligent if the vendor uses a proprietary solution. Ask who has
reviewed the solution, and ask to see the details so you or someone within your
organization can review it. These days, there are few reasons to use a
proprietary solution because both WPA and RSN provide protection robust enough
for almost all organizations. If you are extremely paranoid, you can add
security using upper-layer protection, such as VPN.
Finally, remember, that WPA is an interim solution until IEEE 802.11i RSN is complete. It
may be that the full RSN will become WPA2 in the future. The cryptographic
primitives used in WPA are believed to be robust, but it takes time to ensure
that an algorithm is secure. For instance, RC4 was known publicly for some time
before the problems were found that decimated WEP. As such, you should (if
security is important to you) plan on upgrading your infrastructure to the
AES-based solution (RSN) as soon as you can.