WISDOM Advanced Security Measures
WISDOM Advanced Security is designed for high-level security
WLANs in a converged network that are subject to regulations or legal security
requirements such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2002) for health care systems, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 (U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, 2002) for financial data, sensitive and secure government systems,
or those systems involved in financial transactions. WISDOM Advanced Security
also requires that the WLAN security management considerations and those
required for WISDOM Intermediate Security described earlier be implemented as
part of its layered approach. WISDOM Advanced Security uses an Internet Protocol
Security (IPSec) VPN design to provide high-security risk mitigation for Option
Three.
Because of its widespread use and popularity on wired networks,
IPSec is frequently recommended in the literature as a solution for overcoming
the inadequate standards-based security mechanism built into 802.11 in wireless
networks. Another option, the Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), is popular in some Microsoft-dominated networks
because it is built into many Microsoft products. IPSec is generally recommended
over PPTP for VPN because IPSec is much more resilient in temperamental
networking environments such as wireless. Also, because IPSec encrypts and
authenticates traffic as needed, the overhead on the network is noticeably less
than it is with PPTP, which also makes it possible to temporarily lose your
wireless connection and come back without dropping your VPN connection. IPSec
has many desirable built-in features, such as integrity checking, mutual
authentication, and antireplay. Using a VPN appliance or firewall with
IPSec-enabled WLAN clients does not require you to use only a single vendor's
equipment, as does LEAP and some 802.1x
implementations.
IPSec has a few drawbacks in performance and cost that make the
risk-benefit most applicable for use in Option Three. IPSec on the WLAN
environment prevents roaming, which means that a user will not be able to
seamlessly move about from one access point to another. IPSec requires the use
of additional equipment, software, administrative management, and training.
IPSec VPNs require some overhead in each packet, but this is very small compared
to other VPN protocols such as PPTP. In addition, as a VPN protocol, it only
supports unicast traffic, so applications that use only broadcast or multicast
may not work correctly.
WISDOM Advanced Security uses a VPN appliance that allows limited
Internet access for WLAN users, but requires an IPSec VPN connection before
allowing entrance to the wired network. A VPN requires a VPN switch, also called
a VPN gateway, that can be accessed from the Internet. Restricting unnecessary
or redundant protocols from the LAN segments that connect the APs to the VPN
gateway reduces the possibility of unidentified holes and vulnerabilities. The
LAN segments that connect to wireless APs should connect to a corporate VPN
gateway, but not directly to the production network. Eliminating APs from the
production network minimizes the risk of attack techniques such as packet
sniffing. This option also assumes that a WLAN security policy is in place.
IPSec is a framework of open standards for ensuring secure private
communications over IP networks. IPSec VPNs use the services defined within
IPSec to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data
communications across public networks, such as the Internet. IPSec also has a
practical application to secure WLANs by overlaying IPSec on top of cleartext
802.11 wireless traffic. When IPSec is deployed in a WLAN environment, an IPSec
client is placed on every PC connected to the wireless network, and the user is
required to establish an IPSec tunnel to route any traffic to the wired network.
Filters are put in place to prevent any wireless traffic from reaching a destination other than the VPN gateway
and DHCP/DNS server. IPSec provides for confidentiality of IP traffic, as well
as authentication and antireplay capabilities. Confidentiality is achieved
through encryption using a variant of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) called
Triple DES (3DES). Although IPSec is used primarily for data confidentiality,
extensions to the standard allow for user authentication and authorization to
occur as part of the IPSec process. This scenario offers a potential solution to
the user differentiation problem with WLANs.
IPSec provides numerous security features. The following have
configurable values for the administrator to define their behavior: data
encryption, device authentication and credentialing, data integrity, address
hiding, and Security-Association (SA) key aging. The IPSec standard requires use
of either data integrity or data encryption; using both is optional. WISDOM
Option Three will use both encryption and integrity. Data encryption will be set
for 3DES. Data integrity comes in two types: 128-bit-strength Message Digest 5
(MD5)-HMAC or 160-bit-strength Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-HMAC. Because the bit
strength of SHA is greater, it is considered more secure, and it will be used in
this design. A session key's strength is proportional to the number of binary
bits comprising the session key file. This means that session keys with a
greater number of bits have a greater degree of security and are considerably
more difficult to forcibly decode.
WISDOM Advanced Security uses IPSec VPN(s) as an overlay security
mechanism to access the production network from a WLAN. The WLAN APs will
connect to Layer 2 (OSI Model) switches and forward traffic from the WLAN to the
wired LAN using IPSec to protect the data until it reaches the wired network.
WEP will not be enabled in this design. The WLAN is considered an untrusted
network, suitable only as a transit network for IPSec traffic. The WLAN clients
associate with a wireless AP to establish connectivity to the wired network at
Layer 2. The wireless clients then use DHCP and DNS services in the server
module to establish connectivity to the wired network at Layer 3. When the
wireless client is communicating with the wired network, but before the IPSec
tunnel is established, the client traffic is not considered secure. All of the
noted WLAN security issues are still present until the wireless client can
secure communications with an IPSec VPN. In addition to the implementation of
Option One security requirements, the following will be implemented to mitigate
remaining WLAN vulnerabilities:
-
Personal firewall software is included on the wireless
client to protect the client while it is connected to the untrusted WLAN network
without the protection of IPSec.
-
In general terms, the VPN gateway delineates between the
trusted wired network and the untrusted WLAN. The wireless client establishes a
VPN connection to the VPN gateway to start secure communications to the
corporate network. In the process of doing so, the VPN gateway provides device
and user authentication via the IPSec VPN. Even with this filtering, the DNS and
DHCP servers are still open to direct attack on the application protocols. Extra
care will be taken to ensure that these systems are as secure as possible at the
host level. This will include up-to-date OS and application patches and a
Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS).
The VPN gateway can use digital certificates or preshared public
keys for wireless device authentication. The VPN gateway then takes advantage of
One-Time Passwords (OTPs) to authenticate users to it. Without OTPs, the VPN
gateways are vulnerable to brute force login attempts by hackers who have
obtained the shared IPSec key used by the VPN gateway. The VPN gateway takes
advantage of RADIUS services, which in turn contact the OTP server for user
authentication. The VPN gateway uses DHCP for IP address configuration in order
for the WLAN client to communicate through the VPN tunnel. Security in this
configuration is maintained by preventing network access if a VPN gateway or
RADIUS service fails. Both services are required in order for the client to
reach the wired network with production traffic. In remote-access VPNs, user
authentication and device authentication occurs. When the remote device is
authenticated, some level of access control should be in place to permit only
the traffic over the tunnel that should be there. Device authentication uses
either a preshared key or valid digital certificate issued from a recognized CA
to provide the identity of a device. Digital certificates scale better than
unique preshared public key pairs because they allow any device to authenticate
to any other device but do not have the security properties of wildcard
keys.
A message digest is the representation of text in the form of a
single string of digits, created using a formula called a one-way hash function.
Encrypting a message digest with a private key creates a digital signature,
which is an electronic means of authentication. A one-way hash is an algorithm
that turns messages or text into a fixed string of digits, usually for security
or data management purposes. The "one way" means that it is nearly impossible to derive the original text from the string.
A one-way hash function is used to create digital signatures, which in turn
identify and authenticate the sender and message of a digitally distributed
message.
Digital certificates are not tied to IP addresses, but to unique,
signed information on the device that is validated by the enterprise's CA. If a
hacker compromises or steals a device with a digital certificate, the
administrator will revoke the digital certificate and notify all other devices
by publishing a new Certificate Revocation List (CRL). The CRL contains a
CA-signed list of revoked certificates. When a device receives a request for
tunnel establishment and uses a digital certificate for proof of identity, the
device checks the peer certificate against the CRL. Much of the information
required to manage certificates can be stored in a Lightweight Directory Access
Protocol (LDAP)-compliant directory. LDAP can also contain CRL information.
LDAP, which is used for accessing directory services, provides
even greater flexibility for managing certificates. The CA can use LDAP
directory information as a means to issue certificates individually or in
batches, depending on the security policies of the organization. Other routine
management tasks, such as key management and renewing and revoking certificates,
can be partially or fully automated with the aid of the directory. Devices
generating digital certificates or validating received certificates during
tunnel authentication and establishment must know the correct time of day
(preferably Coordinated Universal Time [UTC]). This is more than just
expiration, it is a frame in which the certificate is valid—not before, not
after. Time is also used to determine when the CRL expires so that a new one can
be retrieved. Although checking CRLs can be configured as optional, it should
always be enabled on remote and head-end devices when digital certificates are
deployed. This is the only revocation scheme for digital certificates compared
to preshared key pairs that are simply removed from the uncompromised
devices.
After the device and user authentications (if applicable) are
complete, IPSec access control occurs. Normally, the networks, hosts, and ports
that are allowed to traverse the tunnels are defined in the Security Policy
Database (SPD), as defined by the IPSec protocol (IETF, 2003). This database is
populated by the use of ACLs, which are sometimes referred to as "crypto ACLs"
or "network rules." For remote-access traffic filtering, access control occurs
dynamically by loading the per-user granular authorization information when the
user successfully authenticates via extended authentication (XAUTH).
WISDOM Advanced Security also provides internal users with
connectivity to Internet services and Internet users with access to information
on the public servers (e.g., Hypertext
Transfer Protocol [HTTP], FTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [SMTP], and DNS).
Additionally, this design will terminate VPN traffic from remote users and
remote sites as well as traffic from traditional dial-in users. The 10 WISDOM
Advanced Security vulnerability, threat, and mitigation elements are described
in Table 12.3. The WISDOM Advanced
Security topology is shown in Figure
12.3. Key design features and components for WISDOM Advanced Security are as
follows:
-
VPN gateway. This authenticates
individual remote users and terminates their IPSec VPN tunnels.
-
Remote-access VPN client with personal
firewall software. This software client provides end-to-end encrypted
tunnels between individual PCs and the corporate wireless VPN gateways; personal
firewall software provides device-level protection for individual PCs.
-
VPN firewall. This provides
network-level protection of resources and stateful filtering of traffic and
differentiated security for remote-access users; it authenticates trusted remote
sites and provides connectivity using IPSec tunnels.
-
VPN concentrator. This authenticates
individual remote users and terminates their IPSec tunnels.
-
NIDS appliance. This provides Layer
4–to–Layer 7 monitoring of essential network segments in the module.
-
DHCP server. This delivers IP
configuration information for wireless VPN clients before and after VPN
establishment.
Table 12.3: WISDOM Advanced Security
Elements
|
Vulnerability |
Threat |
Mitigation |
|
Client's WLAN without IPSec
protection. IPSec renders most of the commonly used attack methods
completely ineffective. It does this by providing confidentiality, integrity,
and authentication of traffic. |
A client's system can be vulnerable to attack when it is
connected to the untrusted WLAN network without the protection of
IPSec. |
Include personal firewall software on the wireless client to
protect the client while it is connected to the untrusted WLAN network without
the protection of IPSec. |
|
DNS and DHCP server
application protocols. These protocols are not protected by the VPN
IPSec solution and will require supplementary host security best-practice
implementation and third-party software to mitigate the risk of attack against
the server(s). |
In general terms, the VPN gateway delineates between the
trusted wired network and the untrusted WLAN. The wireless client establishes a
VPN connection to the VPN gateway to start secure communication to the corporate
network. In the process of doing so, the VPN gateway provides device and user
authentication via the IPSec VPN. This filtering does not protect the
application protocols on the DNS and DHCP servers and therefore leaves them open
to direct attack. Extra care must be taken to ensure that these systems are as
secure as possible at the host level. |
Implement host-level security to include updating and
maintenance of the latest OS and application patches and the use of a host-based
intrusion detection system (HIDS). |
|
Wireless packet sniffers
against WLAN clients. The effort needed for intruders to penetrate a
wireless network is now being lessened with the release of several wireless
sniffer software applications that allow intruders to passively collect data for
real-time or later analysis. Such analysis can lead to the compromise of the
network. AirSNORT is an application that utilizes known WEP flaws to extract the
WEP key and allow unauthorized network access. NetStumbler is a full-featured
wireless sniffer that logs an extensive array of information about any wireless
network it happens to encounter: the MAC address of the access point, the
network name, SSID, manufacturer, channel in use, signal strength, and whether
WEP is enabled, to name a few. An intruder looking to attack a target wireless
network can use all of this information. |
Wireless packet sniffers can take advantage of any of the
known WEP attacks to derive the encryption key and other information valuable
for preattack reconnaissance. |
Use IPSec encryption of wireless client traffic. |
|
Man-in-the-middle
attacks. A man-in-the-middle attack security breach is when a malicious
user intercepts, and possibly alters, data traveling along a network. Security
auditing tools such as dsniff, sshmitm, and webmitm are capable of performing active man-in-the-middle
attacks against encrypted SSH and HTTPS traffic. A rogue access point can
utilize this default behavior to compel clients to connect to a node performing
active man-in-the-middle attacks against sensitive traffic. |
WLANs are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks. The
man-in-the-middle or TCP hijacking attack is a well-known attack where an
attacker sniffs packets from a network, modifies them, and inserts them back
into the network. There are a few programs/ source codes available for doing a
TCP hijack. TCP hijacking is an exploit that targets the victim's TCP-based
applications such as Telnet, rlogin, ftp, mail application, Web browser, etc. An
attacker can grab unencrypted confidential information from a victim's
network-based TCP application and can further degrade the authenticity and
integrity of the data. |
Use IPSec encryption of wireless client traffic. |
|
DHCP IP configuration
protocol spoofing. |
By spoofing the client's packet exchange, a DHCP server will
give all of the available leases to a spoofed MAC address, thus causing a denial
of service. Any machine wishing to join the network after the attack would not
be allocated an IP address because the whole of the DHCP range will have been
either allocated to valid interfaces (i.e., interfaces already joined to the
network before the attack took place) or spoofed MAC addresses. Any interface
already joined to the network would not notice the effect of the attack because
it has already been assigned an IP address, but interfaces without an IP address
would not be able to join the network because the DHCP server will have no
available IP addresses. A rogue DHCP server could also be set up by a hacker.
The DHCP protocol can aid a hacker to redirect traffic through his or her
machine (man-in-the-middle attack) or to send users to false Web pages (via a
rogue DNS server). This could occur because a DHCP server can set various
options, such as what IP address to use for the default gateway and what DNS
servers to use. |
Allow only the known protocols for initial IP configuration
(DHCP) and VPN access (DNS, Internet Key Exchange [IKE], and Encapsulating
Security Payload [ESP]) from the WLAN to the wired network through filtering at
the AP and Layer 3 switch. Enforce authorization policies on the VPN gateway for
individual user groups. |
|
IP spoofing. The
attack is based on the fact that Internet communication between distant
computers is routinely handled by routers, which find the best route by
examining the destination address, but generally ignore the origination address.
The origination address is only used by the destination machine when it responds
to the source.
In a spoofing attack, the intruder sends messages to a
computer indicating that the message has come from a trusted system. To be
successful, the intruder must first determine the IP address of a trusted system
and then modify the packet headers so that it appears as if the packets are
coming from the trusted system. The attacker is fooling (spoofing) the distant
computer into believing that he or she is a legitimate member of the network.
The goal of the attack is to establish a connection that will allow the attacker
to gain root access to the host, allowing the creation of a backdoor entry path
into the target system. |
WLANs are susceptible to IP spoofing. A hacker can use IP
spoofing to gain unauthorized access to the network and computers, whereby the
intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the
message is coming from a trusted host. To engage in IP spoofing, a hacker must
first use a variety of techniques to find an IP address of a trusted host and
then modify the packet headers so that it appears as if the packets are coming
from that host. |
Implement IPSec. Hackers can spoof traffic on an unprotected
WLAN, but only valid, authenticated IPSec packets will ever reach the production
wired network. An effective measure against IP spoofing is the use of a VPN
protocol such as IPSec. This methodology involves encryption of the data in the
packet as well as the source address. The VPN software, or firmware, decrypts
the packet and the source address and performs a checksum. If either the data or
the source address have been tampered with, the packet will be dropped. Without
access to the encryption keys, a potential intruder would be unable to penetrate
the firewall. |
|
ARP spoofing. ARP
spoofing is a method of exploiting the interaction of IP and Ethernet protocols.
It is only applicable to Ethernet networks supporting IP. ARP spoofing involves
constructing forged ARP replies. By sending forged ARP replies, a target
computer could be convinced to send frames destined for computer A to go instead
to computer B. When it is done properly, computer A will have no idea that this
redirection took place. The process of updating a target computer's ARP cache
with a forged entry is referred to as "poisoning." |
ARP is a TCP/IP-based protocol used to convert an IP address
into a physical address (called a Data Link Control [DLC]) such as an Ethernet
address. A host wishing to obtain a physical address broadcasts an ARP request
onto the TCP/IP network. A host on the network that has the IP address in the
request will reply with its physical hardware address. After authenticating, ARP
spoofing attacks can be launched in the same manner as in a wired environment to
intercept other users' data. |
Implement IPSec. ARP spoofing attacks can be launched;
however, data is encrypted to the VPN gateway, so hackers will be unable to read
the data. |
|
Password attacks. An
attacker who obtains some sensitive password-derived data, such as a hashed
password, performs a series of computations using every possible guess for the
password. Because passwords are typically small by cryptographic standards, the
password can often be determined by brute force. Depending on the system, the
password, and the skills of the attacker, such an attack can be completed in
days, hours, or perhaps only a few seconds. A password database should always be
kept secret to prevent a dictionary attack on the data. Obsolete password
methods also permit a dictionary attack by someone who eavesdrops on the
network. Strong password policy enforcement methods prevent this
occurrence. |
As with wired networks, WLANs are vulnerable to exploitation
when weak policies and password controls exist. |
Implement good password policies, one-time-passwords (OTP),
and auditing. |
|
Unauthorized network
topology discovery. Network topology discovery is part of the
reconnaissance process for an adversary planning for unauthorized access to a
network or an attack. |
Unauthorized topology discovery can occur in the same way
that is possible in the wired network. Network topology can aid an adversary in
the attack planning phase when this information is not otherwise
available. |
Control IP configuration protocols. Only IKE, ESP, DNS, and
DHCP will be allowed from the WLAN to the wired network. |
|
MAC/IP spoofing from
unauthenticated users. WLANs are susceptible to both MAC and IP
spoofing. |